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THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: REVOLUTION
OR EVOLUTION?
Pierre-MarieDupuy *
The time seems to have come to reassess the international law of
state responsibility. Several questions are presented by current developments in the theory and practice of attributing international legal
responsibility to a sovereign state. What are the legal basis and the
legal consequences of state responsibility? Which states have a legal
interest in attributing state responsibility? Finally, has the structural
function of international responsibility inside the international legal
system evolved during the last decade?1
Until a few years ago, asking such questions would have only revealed very deep gaps in the legal knowledge of the questioner. The
answers were clear and relatively simple. At least from the end of the
nineteenth century, due largely to the effects of the positivist doctrine,
the unity of the theory of international state responsibility had been
strongly established. 2 This unity concerned both the origin (fait g6n~rateur) of the responsibility and its specific function. The origin of the
responsibility arose in the commission of a wrongful act by a state, in
particular, an act or omission by the state violating its international
obligation vis-A-vis another state. 3 Additionally, the great majority of
*

Professor of Law, Universit6 de Droit d'Economie et de Science Sociale de Paris (Paris 2);

Director, Institut des Hautes Etudes Internationales.
1. Concerning the general evolution of the law of state responsibility in relation to the works
of the International Law Commission during the last twelve years, see in particular I. BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF NATIONS: STATE RESPONSIBILITY, PART I (1983); Condorelli,
L 'imputation d l'Etat d'un Fait Internationalement Illicite: Solutions Classiques et Nouvelles Tendances, 189 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1984); Dupuy, Le Fait Gdnrateurde la Responsabilit6 Internationale des Etats, 188 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1984); Graefrath, Responsibility and Damage
Caused: Relationship Between Responsibility and Damages, 185 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1984);
Riphagen, State Responsibility: New Theories of Obligation in Interstate Relations, in THE STRUCTURES AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY, DOCTRINE
AND THEORY 581 (1983); Simma, Grundfragen der Staatenverantwortlichkeit in der Arbeit der
International Law Commission, 24 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 357 (1986); UNITED NATIONS
CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY (M. Spinedi and B. Simma eds. 1987), with a complete bibliography by M. Spinedi on the codification of state responsibility by the United Nations
(1973-1985).
2. On the unity of the theory of state responsibility, see in particular Ago, Third Report on
State Responsibility, [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 199, §§ 15-19, at 202-03, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/246 and ADD. I-3; see also Reuter, Principes de Droit International Public, 103 RECUEIL
DES CouRs 425, 584 (1961).
3. See infra pp. 110-13.
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authors agreed that the unique function of the institution of state responsibility was to secure reparation for damages created by the
wrongful act, 4 since its only legal consequence was to burden the responsible state with the subsidiary obligation to make reparations for
the tortious results of its wrongful act.
This simple link between the source of responsibility and its legal
consequences had another significance: there were, in principle, only
two states concerned with international responsibility for a wrongful
act: the acting state and the state that suffers damage resulting from
the act. Thus, only the directly damaged state had a right that was
affected by another state's wrongful act.
Recent developments urge a reassessment of this classical doctrine
of state responsibility. In fact, the foundations of the theory began to
shake more than twenty years ago. The first indications of a disruption
in the basic unity of state responsibility emerged as early as the mid1960's, when the eminent scholar Wilfred Jenks, expressing an already
relatively deep movement of thought, pleaded for recognition of state
liability for the potentially catastrophic damage caused by their "ultrahazardous activities." 5 Since he characterized this liability as existing
"without proof of fault," and purported to promote it not only on the
basis of special agreements but in general international law as well, it
appears to be one of the earliest modern attempts to disassociate, in
regard to certain kinds of damages, the obligation to make reparations
6
from the previous commitment of a wrongful act.
An elaboration on the same idea appeared a few years later, when
the International Law Commission ("ILC") was urged to study and
codify the international liability of states "for injurious consequences
4. See, e.g., Bourquin, Rigles Gindrales du Droit de la Paix, 35 RECUEIL DES COURs 218
(1931); Basdevant, Regles Gindrales du Droit de la Paix, 58 RECUEIL DES COURs 668 (1936);
Strupp, Regles Ginirales du Droit de la Paix, 47 RECUEIL DES COURs 561 (1934); Lillich, The
Current Status of the Law of State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens, in INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS 1-16 (R. Lillich ed. 1983). A minority of
authors has criticized the classical theory as being too narrow, some of them pleading in favor of
an international penal responsibility of states in certain cases. See in particular, for the theory of
"penal damages," J. RALSTON, THE LAW AND PROCEDURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
250-67 (1926); Saldana, La Justice Penale Internationale, 10 RECUEIL DES COURS 227 (1925); V.
PELLA, LA CRIMINALITt COLLECTIVE DES ETATS ET LE DROIT PtNAL DE L'AVENIR (2d ed.
1926); H. DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, LES PRINCIPES MODERNES DU DROIT PtNAL INTERNATIONAL (1928); see also P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 11

(1948).
5. Jenks, Liability for Ultra-Hazardous Activities in International Law, 117 RECUEIL DES
COURS 99 (1966).

6. See generally Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of International Law, 14 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 1189 (1965); Kelson, State Responsibility and Abnormally
Dangerous Activities, 13 HARV. INT'L L. J. 243 (1972).
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arising out of acts not prohibited by international law."' 7 Of course,
several conventions previously had paved the way for the establishment of a "primary obligation" of reparation. 8 However, only one of
them, covering reparation for damages caused by falling space objects,
directly concerned state responsibility in public international law. 9 The
question was then and is still whether, outside of any special agreement, there is room for such a liability in general or customary international law.
Whatever the answer, the common ground between this general
liability and the classical model of state responsibility for wrongful
acts is the role or function of the institutions. In each case, what is in
question is the pure allocation of reparation. The evolution of a general liability of states affects the origin of the obligation to make reparations, but not its content, nor its continuing role as the primary, if
not the only, function of the institution of state responsibility in international law.
As these shifts occurred, another evolution, again starting from the
works of the I.C.J. on international responsibility, threatened to implicate not just the origin of the obligation to make reparations, but the
legal consequences of committing some kinds of wrongful acts as well.
Article 19 of part one of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
distinguishes between two kinds of wrongful acts: international
crimes, which are defined as the breach of "an international obligation
essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community," and all acts which, though not crimes, "constitute
an international delict." 10
7. See Magraw, TransboundaryHarm: The InternationalLaw Commission'sStudy of "International Liability," 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1986).
8. See Summary Records of the 21st Session, [1969] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 105-17, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1969; see also Riphagen, supra note 1, at 581; on the distinction between
"primary" and "secondary" rules, see in particular Combacau & Alland, "Primary" and "Secondary" Rules in the Law of State Responsibility: Categorizing International Obligation, 16 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 81-110 (1985); on the different conventions establishing a strict liability in private
international law, see Jenks, supra note 5; see also Dupuy, La Responsabilitd Internationale des
Etats pour les Dommages d'Origine Technologique et Industrielle, 27 PUBLICATIONS DE LA REVUE GtNIfRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1 (1976). A list of these conventions with
complete references is in Handl, Liability as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of
International Law, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 49, 62 n.61 (1985). The newest regime of strict
liability established on the burden of the operator (in private international law) is to be found in
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, June 2, 1988, art. 8,
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 859, 872 (1988).
9. Christol, International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM. J. INT'L L.
346, 352 (1980); see also Foster, International Liability for Damage by Space Objects, 10 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L 137, 142 (1972); see also Dupuy, supra note 8, at 45-97; L. Guttierez, Legal Status of
Space Vehicles, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 132
(1967).
10. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility adopted by the International Law Commission
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Here, the concern becomes the consequences of state responsibility, and which states have an interest in the attachment of that responsibility. ILC discussions of "the content, forms, and degrees of
international responsibility" (part two of the Draft Articles) show a
shift from a tendency to stress the obligations of the responsible state,
to a stress on the right of the injured state (the definition of which is
considerably extended). The function of responsibility appears to be in
this context not only to secure compensation for damage, but to sanction or penalize the responsible state. A final indication of the dissolution of the classical unity of state responsibility is the emphasis by
Professor Riphagen, the former special rapporteur of part two of the
articles, on the existence of "self-contained regimes" of responsibility,
i.e., conventionally defined legal consequences attached to the breach
of treaty obligations."
Thus we see, at this time, a fragmentation of the theory of international state responsibility, a fundamental institution of the international legal system. This should not necessarily be cause for alarm.
Although intellectually more satisfying as a coherent legal instrument,
there is no reason to blindly cling to a limited and perhaps outmoded
classical theory. In fact, this multiplication of legal regimes, more or
less orchestrated by the ILC, may constitute a major advancement in
the international legal system. In other words, the rapid evolution of
international state responsibility is not necessarily a symptom of disease; rather, it may be a sign of vigor and ripeness.
Yet, before accepting this heartening conclusion, the duty of scholon first reading, in Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly, 35 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 64, U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/1980/ADD. I(PART 2); see also Summary Records of
the 28th Session: Draft Articles on State Responsibility Submitted by the Special Rapporteur,
[1976] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 7-19, 55-91, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976; Summary
Records of the 28th Session: Draft Articles on State Responsibility Proposed by the Drafting Committee, [1976] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 239-53, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1976; M. SPINEDI,
Les Crimes Internationaux de I'Etat dans les Travoux de Codification de laResponsibilit6 des
Etats Entrepris par les Nations Unies (EUI Working Paper No 88, 1984), translatedin INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE 7 (J.
Weiler, A. Cassese & M. Spinedi eds. 1989). For commentaries on Draft Article 19 see Llor6ns, La Responsabilidad Internationalpor Violacidn Grave de
ObligacionesEsencialespara laSalvaguardiade Intereses Fundamentalesde la Comunidad Internacional (El "Crimen Internacional"), 8 ANUARIO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 265 (1985);
Dupuy, Action Publique et Crime Internationalde l'Etat."A Propos de I'Article 19 du Projet de la
Commission du Droit Internationalsur laResponsabilitd des Etats, 25 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 539 (1979); Dupuy, Observations sur le Crime Internationalde I'Etat, 84
REVUE GNfRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 449 (1980); Dupuy, Observations sur la

PratiqueRecente des "Sanctions" de Ilicite, 87 REV. GtN. DR. INT. PUB. 505 (1983); Dupuy,
supra note 1; Marek, CriminalizingState Responsibility, 14 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 460 (1978-1979); Pedauye, Los Crimenes de los Estados, 31 REVISTA ESPAF4OLA DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 25 (1978-79); Starace, La ResponsabilitJResultant de la Violation
des Obligations a l'Egard de laCommunaut6 International, 5 RECUEIL DES COURS 263 (1976).
II. See Simma, Self-Contained Regimes, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 1I1 (1985).
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ars is to verify the reality of this diversification of the legal groundings
of the different regimes leading to reparation or sanction. Very much
influenced by the structure and physiognomy of the works of the ILC,
and in particular by the fascinating demonstrations of Professor Roberto Ago, an number of important authors have treated each of the
questions presented above, i.e., the appearance of liability without
fault and responsibility for crimes of states, without considering any
point of contact between them. This view is possible, as has been
pointed out above, because each concerns substantially different
problems. Nevertheless, their common element is the commission of a
wrongful act. On the one hand, has the wrongful act ceased to be, in
regard to damages caused by certain types of activity, the conditional
element of a requirement for reparation? And on the other hand, has
the wrongful act become divided into two categories, namely international crimes and international delicts? In other words, before entering
a discussion of new legal regimes, it seems necessary to show that each
of these regimes is founded on different legal notions and concepts.
However, the emergence of new regimes does not necessarily require
shifting legal grounds. The object of this essay is to verify this
statement.
After briefly summarizing the classical doctrine of state responsibility, Part One will discuss whether extending compensation to the
harmful consequences of certain hazardous activities necessarily involves the recognition of a "liability for lawful conduct" without any
link to traditional ideas of state responsibility.
Part Two, starting again from responsibility for wrongful acts, will
discuss whether raising a new category, the breach of an "essential
obligation" or "international crimes," confers not only an obligation
to make reparations, but a right, in both the victim state and the nonvictim states, to sanction the responsible state.
I.

RESPONSIBILITY AND LIABILITY

A.

Classical Doctrine

The classical doctrine, though founded much earlier, reached its
final form at the end of the 19th century and during the first quarter of
the 20th century under the influence of the positivist school. Thus,
Anzilotti, Basdevant, Bourquin, and Brierly, in particular, brought the
notions of responsibility and liability into almost total synonymity (in2
French, the single term "responsabilit6" serves to describe both.)'
12. See supra note 4; Anzilotti, La ResponsibilitdInternationaledes Etats, a Raison des Dommages Soufferts par des Etrangers, 8 REVUE GfNRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC,
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Under this doctrine, which, with a few exceptions, has molded positive
law until quite recently, international responsibility may be defined according to its content, which consists of the state's liability for its own
wrongful acts.' 3 The legal bond resulting from committing a wrongful
act may be viewed bilaterally, uniting the wrongdoer with the state it
has injured.
This unified theory of responsibility and liability evolved in two
ways. The first was a radical pruning of the notion of a wrongful act
giving rise to responsibility. According to Anzilotti, the wrongful act
is one that deviates from "objective international law."' 14 Thus, all
that is needed to establish wrongfulness is a manifest contradiction
between the actual behavior of the state and the prescription of the
rule of law. No reference is made to the psychological state of the
actor. This dramatic simplification was intended to make a clean break
between the wrongful act and the theory of culpa, stemming not from
the Roman but chiefly from the Natural Law. Here, the state, a corporate body, does not have human feelings; it obeys the rules or ignores
them, that is all. A second, no less drastic simplification of the link
imputing the wrongful act to the state is made by the classical authors.
Anzilotti, again, states simply: "Imputability, from the viewpoint of
international law, is nothing more than the consequence of the causal
link between an act against international law and the activity of the
State from which the act comes."' 5 This systematic rationalization
inevitably comprises some fictions. For example, in many cases the
content of the responsibility is so defined that the behavior it refers to
is legal only when conforming with certain motives or requirements.
To enforce these rules, research into the motives behind a state's acts
or omissions is necessary.
Examples of this type of case are numerous.' 6 For instance, paragraph four of Resolution 1803 (XVII) of the General Assembly of the
U.N., relating to Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
(which, it is generally agreed, has become a customary rule) states that
nationalization, expropriation, or requisition must be grounded upon
reason of public utility, security or national interest. In practice, the
presumption that good faith attaches to the acts of sovereign states
nn.1-2; I. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS (6th ed. 1963); Rdgles Gindrales de Droit de la Paix,
4 RECUEIL DES COURS 58 (1936).
13. J. de Arechaga, InternationalResponsibility, 1968 MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

531; Ago, Third Report on State Responsibility, [1971] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, pt. I paras. 3042, at 205-14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/246/ADD.1-3; Dupuy, supra note 1, at 28-36.
14. Anzilotti, supra note 12, at n.14.
15. Id.
16. See Dupuy, Faute de l'Etat et Fait InternationalementIllicite, 5 DROITS 51-63 (1987).
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will force a victim to bring proof in the case of the non-legal motivations of the nationalizing public authority. Nevertheless, the judge or
arbitrator may, in accordance with this rule, examine the "subjective
motivation" which caused the State to decide upon nationalization.
Similarly, in order to establish whether the recourse to armed force
constitutes an "aggression," the text of Resolution 3314 of the General
Assembly provides certain criteria. The use of armed force against
"the political independence of another State" (art. 1) is considered an
"aggression," whereas its use in order to win self-determination, liberty or independence for peoples deprived of these by force could, ac17
cording to article 7, in some cases be considered non-aggressive.
Again, it is the purpose for which force is used that determines the
illegal nature of the act.18
Finally, application of the general principle of non-discrimination,
whether in respect of human rights, the treatment of foreign individuals, 19 or economic matters 20 , will often require an investigation of the
discriminating act's finality. Precedents could also be cited, such as
where Judge Ammoun, in his separate opinion in the Barcelona Traction case, wrote: "[m]any decisions have not avoided all confusion between reparation stricto sensu, as in private municipal law, and the
'satisfaction' demanded by powerful States, which gives reparation
lato sensu the character of a measure aimed at deterrence or
punishment.",21

Nevertheless, it is suggested that these criticisms, while they show
the over-simplified nature of the classical positivist doctrine, do not
outweigh the advantages of the thesis of unity itself. In fact, the result
of simplifying the concept of wrongful act, pruning the link of imputation down to a causal connection and unifying the object and the purpose of engaging responsibility, has been to assemble a well-oiled
compensating mechanism, giving to the judge or arbitrator a series of
references and operative concepts which are efficient and allowing a
17. See I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 360-61
(1963); Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention and Self-Defence in Modern International Law, 2
RECUEIL DES COURs 411, 458 (1972); Farer, Drawing the Right Line: Appraisals of the ICJ's
Decision Nicaragua v. United States, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 112 (1987); MacDonald, The Nicaragua Case. New Answers to Old Questions? 24 CAN. Y.B. INT. L. 127 (1986).
18. See Gounelle, La Motivation des Actes Juridiques en Droit InternationalPublic, 33 PUBLICATIONS DE LA REVUE GtNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 14 (1979).
19. See Lillich, supra note 4.
20. See Sutton, Equality and Discrimination in InternationalEconomic Law (VI): Trends in
Regulation of InternationalTrade in Textiles, 1977 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 190; Stoiber, Equality and
Discrimination in InternationalEconomic Law (VII): The MultinationalEnterprise, 1977 Y.B.
WORLD AFF. 217.

21. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company Limited (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 292
(Feb. 5).
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certain latitude in their application through adapting his personal appreciation of the facts and attitudes to the circumstances of the case.
The element of compensation present in international responsibility is
evidently still flourishing. The I.C.J. decision in the Iran Hostages case
demonstrates very well this vocational consistency inherent in the responsibility of states. After having observed the Islamic Republic's violation of several of its international obligations, the Court concluded,
by a 12 to 3 margin that:
The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is under an obligation to
make reparation to the Government of the United States of America for
the injury caused to the latter by the 22
events of the 4th November 1979
and what followed from these events.

Thus, while perhaps not exclusive, the obligation to make reparation
for the damage caused by its violation of law remains a vital conse23
quence of the engagement of a State's responsibility.
B. Extending the Compensatory Function of Responsibility
The compensatory function of responsibility remains strong, even
if in a new form deviating from that of classical reparation. The legal
grounding, however, seems relatively unchanged, despite the currently
fashionable view to the contrary.
Much has been discussed in the literature and in the International
Law Commission about states' international liability for damage
24
caused by "ultra-hazardous" or "abnormally dangerous" activities.
The ILC refers to "international liability for injurious consequence
'25
arising out of acts not prohibited by international law."
22. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 45
(May 24).
23. One should notice, for instance, that in the Case concerning Military and Paramilitary
Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 20 (Merits: June 27), the
principal request of Nicaragua was to ask the Court:
"Third: to adjudge and declare that, in consequence of the violations of international law
indicated ...,compensation is due to Nicaragua, both on its own behalf and in respect of
wrongs inflicted upon its nationals ...Fourth: without prejudice to the foregoing request,
the Court is requested to award to the Republic of Nicaragua the sum of 370,000,000 United
States dollars, which sum constitutes the minimum valuation of the direct damages .. .
resulting from the violations of international law indicated in the substance of this
Memorial."
In the Rainbow Warrior case, the agreement between France and New Zealand offers another
example of a state which is the victim of a wrongful act requesting compensation from the offending state to fulfill its responsibility under international law. See generally Echanges de Lettres
Relatifs an Reglements des Problemes nes de I'incident du Rainbow Warrior, signes d Paris le 9
Juillet 1986 (2), 90 REVUE GtiNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1094-1098; Charpentier, L'Affaire du Rainbow Warrior, 31 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
210 (1985); Apollis, Le Reglement de l'Affaire du Rainbow Warrior, 91 REVUE GtNtRALE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 9 (1986).
24. See supra notes 5 & 6.
25. See Magraw, supra note 7, at 306; Dupuy, supra note 8.
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The Commission's concern, which can be understood from the theoretical premises established earlier by R. Ago, has been, from the
beginning, liability as a primary obligation. 26 The ILC was then exposed to the danger of creating an artificial gap between wrongful acts
and "acts not prohibited by international law." In fact, if one considers state practice as well as the very few cases dealing with this matter,
it is clear that this legal barrier simply does not exist when not voluntarily established in advance by states in formal agreements, as occurs
in public international law only in the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Objects Launched into Outer
27
Space.
The evolution of the works of the ILC, based on the five reports of
the late Professor Quentin-Baxter, is illustrative of the profound theoretical and practical difficulties encountered when trying to construct a
completely autonomous international liability for lawful conduct. The
work of the ILC on M. Barboza's reports confirms this problem.
After a courageous attempt in this direction, the first Special Rapporteur on this topic has progressively moved towards a scheme in
which the principle of strict liability is relegated to a very subsidiary
role, with emphasis on the general obligation to cooperate and its numerous implications. 28 The result of this work was to reintegrate this
liability into the framework of the classical responsibility for wrongful
acts.
Observing this evolution, one of the most rigorous and pertinent
scholars in his field, Professor Gunther Handl, has attempted to define
a theory of liability for lawful acts. 29 Regarding the scope of a strict
liability or "liability for lawful conduct," he clearly departs from the
26. For a description of the preparatory work of the ILC and the genesis and evolution of the
topic, see Magraw, supra note 7; Miatello, InternationalResponsibility for the Use of Nuclear
Energy, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 315-16;
Handl, Liability as an Obligation Established by a PrimaryRule of InternationalLaw, 16 NETH.
Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1985); see also Akehurst, InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences
Arising out of Acts Not Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1985); Pinto,
Reflections on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw, 16 NETH. Y.B. INTL'L L. 17 (1985).
27. 10 I.L.M. 250 (1972).
28. See Quentin-Baxter, Third Report on InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, [1982] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1),
at 51, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/360; Quentin-Baxter, Fourth Report on InternationalLiabilityfor In-

jurious ConsequencesArising Out of Acts Not Prohibtedby InternationalLaw, [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N (pt. 1), at 201, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/373; Quentin-Baxter, Fifth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International
Law, [1984] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1), at 155, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/583 ADD. 1; Magraw,
supra note 7, at 305-30; McCaffrey, Current Developments, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 50-51 (1988)
(discussion of reports by Barboza).

29. See Handl, supra note 26, at 49-79; see also Handl, State Responsibility for Accidental
TransnationalEnvironmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 525 (1980).
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opinion expressed by authors like Wilfred Jenks and L.F.E. Goldie,
who assign to it a much larger field, extending to the coverage of all
damages caused by "ultra-hazardous activities."'30 In Handl's view,
the source state of a transboundary harm bears no responsibility unless
its conduct has fallen short of the standard of care that, in the circumstances of the case, this state could reasonably have been expected to
3
adopt. 1
This idea should certainly take into account the general evolution
of the law of cooperation which has been developing for almost
twenty-five years, particularly in the field of the protection of the international environment. 32 This law concerns, in reality, the definition of
the contemporary conditions of a state's exercise of its territorial and
personal jurisdiction in regard to other states and the international
community as a whole. The general trend emerging from the many
texts, "soft" as well as "hard," which have been adopted during this
period is clearly oriented towards a more precise definition of the general obligation of "due diligence" required of every sovereign state regarding activities likely to cause transboundary damage. There is no
general consent in the international community on the definition of an
"ultra-hazardous activity;" nor is there, consequently, any agreement
on a legal regime of liability to compensate the victim state. 33 One
could have thought, at minimum, based not only on existing international agreements but also on special municipal legislation in this matter, that the "civil utilization of nuclear energy" would be regarded as
such an internationally recognized hazardous activity. Yet, the aftermath of the accident at Chernobyl has emphatically demonstrated the
contrary. Professor Handl's assertion that strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities does not exist in general international law is thus
conclusive.
Less convincing, however, is Professor Handl's attempt to retain a
liability of states "for lawful activities" in "cases of loss-shifting in
which transnational harm is inherently accidental and there is no evident failure on the part of the source State to act in accordance with
an incumbent obligation to prevent such harm." 34 In theory, this con30. See Jenks, supra note 5, at 99-200; Goldie, supra note 6, at 1189.
31. See Handl, supra note 26, at 58-61.
32. See CENTER FOR STUDIES & RESEARCH, HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L LAW, TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 33-126 (1985); WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT,
DEVELOPMENT 5-133 (1986).

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION

AND

SUSTAINABLE

33. 1 LA REPARATION DES DOMMAGES CATASTROPHIQUES (XIlIene Journ6es Juridiques
Jean Dabin 1988) (volume 2 to be published in 1989).
34. See Handl, supra note 26, at 60, 76-79.
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clusion seems to be a logical one. It recalls in particular the cases in
which the common law systems, on the basis of the rule laid down in
Rylands v. Fletcher, established a regime of strict liability. 35 It is, however, very difficult to elaborate a comprehensive notion of "inherently
accidental" situations in general international law, outside of "force
majeure," in which the liability of the source state would in principle
not attach. The reasons are similar to those which explain the absence
'3 6
of a stable, well-delimited definition of "ultra-hazardous activities."
In fact, what is to be considered is not the accidental situation itself,
but the activity at the origin of it. As recognized by Professor Handl,
accidents arising non-negligently are "rather exceptional," 37 if not
non-existent. This state of things derives also from the progressive accumulation of standards and rules defining more and more precisely
the required "due diligence," especially in regard to dangerous activities. 38 Admittedly, when consulting the practice of states one can find
sporadic examples of state practice in which an accidental transnational harm has given rise to compensation, some appearing not to
have been granted "ex gratia. ' ' 39 But these precedents are much too
rare to be regarded as the clear expression of an "opinio juris" of the
international community of states.
Once again, the Chernobyl case is illustrative in this context. 40 It
was an accident, caused by an activity in which the utmost care is
generally expected of the operator (one of the reasons why the existing
conventions establish in regard to it a private international regime of
strict liability.) Now, without entering into the details of this case,
two general observations can be made here. First, it is clearly established that this nuclear accident, like earlier ones in other countries,
35. See Anderson, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally Dangerous,
Ultrahazardous,or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99.
36. See Dupuy, supra note 8. This notion is highly relative, since it depends very much on
control of the technologies involved, as well as the psychology of the legislator, both of which
may vary considerably over time. For a recent survey of national legislation, see Survey of State
Practice Relevant to InternationalLiabilityfor Injurious ConsequencesArising Out ofActs Prohibited in InternationalLaw, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/384, at 222 (1984).
37. Handl, supra note 26, at 61.
38. See supra note 32.
39. See Survey of State Practice, supra note 36.
40. See Gaja, incidente a Chernobyl ed obbligo di informazione, 69 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO
INTIERNAZIONALE 828 (!986); Rubin, The Soviet Nuclear Disaster and the Law, 35 INT'L PRAC.

8 (1986); Strohl, Tchernobyl et le Probldme des Obligations Internationales Relatives aux Accidents Nucldaires, 1986 POLITIQUE ETRANGERE 1035; Kiss, L 'accidentde Tchernobyl et Ses Consdqudnces au Point de Vue du Droit International, 32 ANNUAIRE FRAN§AIS DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 139 (1986); Handl, Aprds Tchernobyl. Quelques Reflexions sur le Programme
Legislatif Multilaterala L'ordre du Jour, 92 REVUE GtNIRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC 5 (1988); Blix, The Post-Chernobyl Outlook for Nuclear Power, INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY BULL. at 9 (Autumn 1986).
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finds its origins in a series of seriously negligent acts taken by both the
staff of the plant and the Soviet authorities. This proves once again
that damages caused in the context of nuclear civil energy are not "inherently accidental," a conclusion which could be similarly drawn in
chemical disasters such as Seveso or Bhopal, or other harmful consequences of modern industrial and technological activities. Second, the
attitude of the states directly or indirectly concerned by the accident is
highly demonstrative. The USSR has plainly asserted that there is no
international rule of liability for the compensation of damages resulting from such an accident, 4' but, more significantly, no competent authority from the victim states enjoying radioactive fallout has invoked
either the negligence of the Soviet government or the existence of a
general customary rule of strict liability on the basis of which they
could have claimed compensation. 42 Similarly, on a regional scale,
although occurring in a context of intense solidarity and cooperation,
the November, 1986 Sandoz Fire which produced massive pollution in
the Rhine River and the riparian states downstream, demonstrates exactly the same absence of invocation by any concerned state of a general rule of strict liability applicable to Switzerland. 43 Any identifiable
consensus between sovereign States today in this matter would thus be
twofold. First, that there is no precise category of "inherently accidental" situations, and secondly, that in the case of accidents caused
by dangerous activities provoking transboundary harm, no rule of
strict liability applies to the source state.
Thus, what is clear is that any attempt at elaborating a general
theory of liability based on the qualification of the facts at the origin of
the damage is simply misleading. 44 The true question is not whether a
state must make reparation for damage even if it is caused by a legal
international act. The lawfulness of an act is not, indeed, an intangible
thing, established a priori. It depends very much upon the entire factual and normative context in which it is undertaken. While it may be
legal today, in certain circumstances, and in certain legal conditions, it
could be illegal tomorrow, or be in the process of becoming illegal, if
the concrete situation or the law applicable to it is changing. Experi41. See Handl, supra note 40, at 33.
42. See Handl, supra note 40, at 33; Kiss, supra note 40; see also Tokyo Economic Summit,
Statement on the Implications of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident, May 5, 1986, reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 1005 (1986).
43. See Kiss, "Tchernobdle" ou la Pollution Accidentelle du Rhin pardes Produits Chimiques,
23 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 719 (1987); Rest, The Sandoz Blaze and
the Pollution of the Rhine in Regard to Public International Law, 1987 TIJDSCHRIF' MILIEU
AANSPRAKELIJKHEID 59.

44. For further developments on this issue, see Dupuy, supra note 1, at 68-77.
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ence with the evolving law of torts in the municipal law of several
states within the United States furnishes an excellent illustration of
this, in a similar context. 45 One cannot then use a moving yardstick.
Of course, it can always be argued that, for example, the building
of a dam or the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are
inherently legal for a state, as exercises of its sovereign territorial
rights. But these activities only remain legal insofar as they lie within
the standards of due diligence existing in order to prevent any harmful
use of the national territory. And in the case of an accident, the burden could indeed rest with the origin state to prove that the accident
does not demonstrate in itself that the obligation of due diligence has
not been ignored. But that corresponds only to a reversal of the burden of proof, no more. Fundamentally, in such a situation, the framework of the classical responsibility for a wrongful act remains.
The question is not the qualification of the harmful act. It is a
much more pragmatic, empirical one: can an innocent victim (in this
case a state third party to the dangerous activity involved) obtain compensation without having to prove that the origin of the damage was a
wrong or a technical negligence, which may be very difficult? The
creation of conventional regimes of strict liability, in the area concerning damage caused by peaceful use of the atom or maritime transport
or offshore oil exploration have brought affirmative answers to this
question, but by imputing the obligation to compensate .to a private
person, the "operator" of the activity in question. And even in the
only conventional regime of strict liability of states in public international law (the 1972 space law convention), the legal regime created
seems to describe a liability established without requiring proof of the
existence of a technical fault or negligence rather than real liability for
is the
an activity not prohibited by international law. 46 An example
47
territory.
Canadian
on
954
fall of the Soviet satellite Cosmos
Alongside existing conventional regimes, or foreseeable and desirable conventions on other hazardous activities, strict liability regimes
could be easily instituted. But other techniques making use of presumptions or, in the law of the environment, of quantified eco-standards, 48 could also make access to reparation much easier than
45. See Anderson, supra note 35.
46. Reuter, Le dommage comme condition de la responsabilitdinternationale,2 ESTUDIOS DE
DERECHO INTERNA IONAL 837, 837-40 (1979).

47. See Christol, supra note 9.
48. See Sand, The Creation of TransnationalRules for Environmental Protection, in I.U.C.N.
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW PAPER No.15, TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND

LAW 311 (1980). International eco-standards are essentially divided into two categories. The
first is that of qualitative eco-standards. These are basically parameters taken into account be-
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classical responsibility theory allows while remaining within the limits

imposed on responsibility for wrongful acts. 49
To conclude on this first point, the different tendencies discussed
above, far from illustrating the decline of the classical function of responsibility, i.e., to give rise to reparation, may, on the contrary, be

seen as reaffirming it, at the minor cost of diversifying the legal regimes which put it into effect, but without necessarily changing its
fundamental legal basis.
At the same time, without any special link between the two evolutions, another movement can be seen. In contrast with the first, these
new trends emphasize the wrongfulness of certain acts. The commitment of such acts is described by some states and authors as demanding not simply reparation but "sanctions," a term which will be
revealed next in all its ambiguity.
II.

RESPONSIBILITY AND SANCTION

The works of the ILC on the content, forms, and degrees of international responsibility, as well as the practice of some states in the past
decade, have shown one outstanding feature: to a large extent, the
debate seems to have shifted during the last twelve years from the
classical emphasis on the obligations of the responsible State, towards
an awareness and definition of the rights of the injured State or States
vis-A-vis the responsible one.50 This development is closely connected
cause they influence the quality of the environment and the ecological equilibrium of a given
natural resource. Although these standards are useful, they are often still open to discussion,
both because of the "soft" (i.e. non-compulsory) character of many of the legal instruments incorporating them and because of their widely varying effectiveness. They do, nevertheless, contribute to the definition of the guidelines, rules of good behavior and "due diligence" of the "wellgoverned" modern state in contemporary international law. The second category is that of quantitative eco-standards which are generally set by agreement among technicians and experts in the
matter. These eco-standards are frequently encountered in technical annexes and occasionally
the text of some conventions for the protection of the environment. For a typical example see
Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado
River, Aug. 30, 1973, United States-Mexico, 24 U.S.T. 1968, T.I.A.S. No. 7708, reprinted in 12
I.L.M. 1105 (1973). For an examination of the system of presumption of responsibility and the
burden of a state infringing technically quantified water quality norms, see Dupuy, supra note 1,
at 74-77, 87-90. The mere technical demonstration that the riverwater arriving from the upstream state does not meet the agreed standards establishes a presumption that the upstream
state has violated the terms of the convention; see also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 1; I. BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 477 (3rd ed. 1979).
49. See supra note 46.
50. Riphagen, Second report on the content forms and degrees of international responsibility
(part 2 of the draft articles), [1981] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1),
at 79, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
344 [hereinafter Second report]; Riphagen, Third report on the content, forms and degrees of international responsibility, [1982] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1),
at 22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/354 &
Add. I & 2 [hereinafter Third report]; Riphagen, Fourth report on the content, forms and degrees
of international responsibility (part 2 of the draft articles), [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1),
at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/366 & Add 1;Riphagen, Fifth report on the content, forms and degrees
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with another: in case of failure of certain kinds of obligations, not
only one but, in certain cases, all states seem now concerned with consequences of these international wrongful acts.
Still, the state that has an individual right directly affected goes on
being the first concerned. It remains the only one that can ask for
material reparation or even moral satisfaction for the direct damage
suffered. But when the wrongful act concerns "fundamental interests
of the international community," like in the case of an act of aggression, for instance, then other states, in fact all other states, belonging
to this community should be logically considered as having a legal
interest in the attachment of international responsibility to the state
actor." This is a result of the fundamental distinction already mentioned between "international delicts" and "international crimes" and
applies only to the latter of these categories. It explains why, when
presenting his second series of draft articles in his third report, Professor Riphagen insisted on the existence of two kinds of "injured states,"
those that are "directly" injured, and those that are "indirectly" injured by an international crime. This is terminology that, in itself,
seems to be inaccurate; all states could consider themselves to be "directly" affected by a crime, but not in regard to the same legal interest.5 2 What matters in this respect is to understand the logical
sequence which has led progressively to the widening of the legal interests involved by the breach of some "community obligations" 53 and,
consequently, of the categories of states concerned with the implementation of the international responsibility which a particular wrongful
act entails.
From this point of view, the emergence of an international criminal responsibility, even if it remains highly problematic both substantively and procedurally, follows the logic of a certain evolution, not
only based on the special character of the obligation ignored by the
responsible state but stemming from a comprehensive perception of
the implications and consequences of international responsibility for
of international responsibility (part 2 of the draft articles), [1984] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (pt. 1),
at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/380 (report also contains new draft articles 1-16).
51. See Alland, International Responsibility and Sanctions. Self-Defense and Countermeasures in the ILC Codification of Rules Governing International Responsibility, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 186; Dupuy, supra note 1; see
generally the works cited at supra note 10; Mohr, The ILC's Distinction Between "International
Crimes" and "International Delicts" and its Implications, in UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION
OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 131.

52. See infra p. 123.
53. i.e., obligations "so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the interna-

tional community that its breach is recognized as a crime by the community as a whole." Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 19.
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wrongful acts. In fact, this perception existed long before the proposals
made in this respect by the ILC in 1976. Here again, the analysis leads
to the conclusion that, between the classical concept of state responsibility and its new "criminal" trends, there is, to a certain extent, more
of a continuity than a brutal discontinuance. After having discussed
the fundamental elements of the phenomenon, we shall come back to
the content of the rights of the "injured states" in the context of international "criminal" responsibility.
A.

The Real Consequences of the Implementation
of InternationalResponsibility

What is important here is to realize how the notion of "legal interest to act" on the implementation of responsibility starts from a certain conception of the consequences of responsibility which preceded
the actual tendency towards an enlargement of the categories of states
possessing such a legal interest. It is generally agreed that the principle of "restitutio in integrum" is clearly recognizable in the famous
statement of the Permanent International Court of Justice in the
Chorzdw Factory case. The Court there stated the principle that reparation must, as far as possible, negate all the consequences of the
wrongful act and reestablish the situation which should have prevailed
4
if this wrongful act had never been committed..
That formulation is still up to date. Proof may be found in a still
recent arbitral decision, 55 but also in the .second report by M.W.
Riphagen before the ILC. 56 It appears explicitly in two articles of his
successive drafts as well. 57 It is in terms of restitution then that the
consequences of a wrongful act have been traditionally viewed. However, within this vast and rather ill-defined framework, it would be
advisable to distinguish what is effectively associated with compensation for material damage from that which aims at reestablishing
legality.
In fact, it appears that rather than speaking of restitution, too easily considered as one of the normative consequences of an illegal act
and consisting solely of compensation, it would be preferable to insist
on the idea of restoration. The point is still to restore the victim to his
initial material position. But it is also to reestablish the legal situation
54. Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 8 (July 26).
55. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libya, 17 I.L.M. 3 (1977) (International Arbitral
Tribunal).
56. Riphagen, Second report, supra note 50, at 81-101.
57. Riphagen, Second report, supra note 50, at 101 (Draft Article 4(c)); Riphagen, Third
report, supra note 50, at 48 (Draft Article 6(c)).
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that existed before the violation. In other words, committing an illegal
act strikes two blows: one at the rule of law, and the other at the
interest protected by the law. A wrongful act is the equivalent, so to
speak, of a failure to recognize both the law and an individual right.
Restoration is an expression suggested to designate the object and purpose of responsibility as it is seen from these two angles, objective and
abstract on the one hand, subjective and often material on the other. It
encompasses both the reestablishment of the legal situation before the
action (to guarantee the integrity of the law) and compensation for the
damage incurred, in order to safeguard the victim's interest.
In many cases, these aims are achieved by the material compensation for damage caused, which better explains the assimilation of both
elements by the doctrine. When the French embassy in Libya was set
afire by demonstrators a few years ago, revealing a defect in the Libyan authorities' preventive measures, the host government discharged
itself, albeit slowly, of its obligation to restore the situation, both material and legal, to what it had been before the incident, by assuming the
costs of a new embassy building. The compensation awarded constituted recognition that the act at the origin of the incident was, at the
same time, of an illegal nature and imputable to this State. Furthermore, compensation is often accompanied by apologies or the expression of regret by the responsible State, addressed to the victim State,
by which "satisfaction" is deemed to have been given. In the very rich
area of injury caused to the person or damage caused to the property
of aliens, material restitution or money payment and restoration of the
58
legal situation become completely intertwined. .
But this is not always the case. To return to the hostage case (USA
v. Iran), it is illuminating to analyze the actual structure of the Court's
conclusion. It begins by declaring the illegal nature of the various actions of the Islamic Republic. It then calls upon Iran to put a stop to
the continuing illegal situation (illegal detention of embassy staff). It
concludes by stating the obligation for Iran to compensate the United
States.5 9 The various elements constitute the restoration'of a situation
conforming to the prescriptions of law. As described above, such a
perception of the implementation of responsibility has inspired draft
article 6, proposed by W. Riphagen in his Fifth Report, which corresponds to the classical viewpoint. As a matter of fact, Anzilotti himself, a true representative of the classical view, has described the main
58. See Lillich, supra note 4.
59. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff In Tehran (U.S..v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 4445 [May 24, 1980]; cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (U.S. v.
Nicar.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 19-20,149 (paras. 12-14) (Merits: June 27).
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outlines of the problem as follows: "la violation de l'ordre juridique
international commise par un Etat soumis a cet ordre donne ainsi naissance a un devoir de reparation, qui consiste en general dans le retablissement de l'ordre juridique trouble."' 60 He continues by adding:
"Le dommage se trouve compris implicitement dans le caractre antijuridique de l'acte. La violation de la regle est effectivement toujours
un derangement de l'interet qu'elle protege, et, par voie de consequence, aussi du droit subjectif de la personne a laquelle l'interet
' '6
appartient. 1
Nevertheless, while based on a rather abstract conception of damage, this view was less advanced than that of the ILC in its notion of
dematerialization of the responsibility. The definition of responsibility
is greatly enlarged, since it no longer focuses only on the responsible
state's obligation, but is defined as all sorts of new relations which can
originate in international law in the wrongful act of a state. 62 This
new definition paved the way for a progressive widening of the interest
in restoration, and, consequently, to a differentiation of the categories
of states possessing such an interest. For Anzilotti, even material damage only affected a subjective interest, while for the ILC, insofar as the
need created by the damage disappears, the victim's individuality
blurs. The materialist, patrimonial view of responsibility was narrow
but it limited the link then established to a bilateral relationship between the source of the damage and the individual victim. This link
was not changed by Anzilotti, insofar as it reduced the damage to the
violation of a subjective right, but his abstract conception of the prejudice opened the way towards widening interest at restoration. Indeed,
insofar as it is no longer simply a case of compensation for material
damage but of reestablishing legality, widening the ambit of the legal
obligation violated will suffice if cardinal importance is given to such
an obligation within the membership of a legally defined group, 63 each
of its members possessing an objective interest in restoring the law.
This is what was accomplished by the ILC in 1976 by adopting article
19 (part 1). But in this article, the legally defined group is the international community itself!
60. Anzillotti, supra note 12, at 13. Translation: "the violation of the international legal order committed by a state subjected to it thus gives rise to a duty of reparation which generally
consists in reestablishing the disturbed legal order."
61. Id. Translation: "The damage is implicitly bound up with the the anti-legal nature of the
act. To violate the rule is indeed always a disturbance of the interest it protects, and thus, of the
subjective right of the person whose interest it is."
62. Summary Records of the Twenty-Fifth Session, [1973] 1 Y.B. INT'L L.COMM'N (1202d1204th mtg.) at 5-18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1973.
63. Usually established by means of a treaty.
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B.

Responsibility and the Rights of Injured States

As already mentioned, it seems incorrect in law to speak of States
"indirectly injured" or a fortiori of "third States" in relation to the
attachment of an international responsibility for a crime of State. It
follows logically from the nature of the "community obligation"
which has been breached in such a case that all the sovereign States,
since they belong to the universal community, are directly concerned.
One of them is, however, affected in its subjective (i.e. individual)
rights by the crime, because one of its own sovereign rights has been
infringed upon. An example is the case when part of a State's own
territory, and thus its subjective rights, has been invaded, while other
States are affected in their objective right to the restoration of the international legal regime composed of those norms of public policy
which are of "essential importance" for the integrity and maintenance
of the international community. It is quite clear that in reality the difference of right (subjective or objective) which has been outlined above
also explains the different aims of each State's action. But this difference, simple in theory, might become more blurred in practice, particularly when all reactions to illegal behavior are confused by referring
to them as "counter measures" as invited by article 30 (part 1) of the
ILC draft articles. 64
The discussion of these ideas encompasses not only the content and
commentaries of the ILC work based on R. Ago's reports, but also, on
the one hand, by the doctrine of eastern, i.e. socialist, authors and, on
the other hand, by the effective practice of Western countries, in particular the United States, and also, though often less enthusiastically,
the Western European countries, acting jointly or separately.
The socialist authors have produced among the earliest analyses in
which international responsibility is presented not only as a means to
allocate reparation to the victim State but also as an instrument for the
reestablishment of international legality. 65 For them, international re64. See supra note 51; Malanczuk, Countermeasuresand Self-Defense as CircumstancesPrecluding Wrongfulness in the InternationalLaw Commission's Articles on State Responsibility, in
UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 1, at 197; see also Dupuy, Observations sur la Pratique,supra note 10; Leben, Les contre-mesures inter-dtatiqueset les
rdactionsd lIlicite dons la socidtd internationale,28 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9 (1982); E. ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES (1984).

65. See Levin, Die Verantwortlichkeit der Staaten im Gegenwdrtigen volkerrecht, 46 AKTUELLE BEITRAGE DER STAATS-UND RECHTWISSENSCHAFT 1 (1969). For a general survey of
the socialist doctrine see Graefarth, supra note 1. For a comparison of socialist doctrine with the
major tendencies of the Western European doctrine see Combacau, Aspects Nouveaux de la
Responsibilitd Internationale.-Deux Approches Contradictoires?,8 JOURNEES DE LA SOCIETE DE
LEGISLATION COMPAREE 187 (1986).
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sponsibility thus defined lato sensu established a new legal relation between the defaulting State and the others legally concerned, and this
new relation appears as soon as the primary obligation has been
breached, and only by the fact of this breach (damage, then, is not a
necessary element of international responsibility). One should recognize here ideas which correspond to those of R. Ago. Nevertheless, as
far as the international responsibility for crimes is concerned, an important aspect of the socialist position is that, in spite of its appellation, this responsibility does not introduce a "criminal" or "penal"
responsibility in international law. It simply incorporates the legal
consequences attached to the breach of particularly important
66
obligations.
In any case, one must notice that the socialist countries have not
used this argument to justify their practical conduct of international
relations. The paradox is that, while criticizing the above-stated conception of international responsibility, the United States and the European countries have taken several initiatives, acting individually or
jointly, for example in the framework of the meetings of the Group of
Seven or inside the European Council of Heads of State and of Government. Especially during the first part of the 1980s, they "sanctioned" the breach of some fundamental international obligations by
several other States, such as the USSR, Poland, and Argentina, revealing conceptions which, in fact, are not that far from the theories of
the other side. The American measures against Iran in the hostage
case and the British measures against Argentina in the Falklands affair
should be considered separately; they come under the classification of
classic bilateralism and concern, in the former case, reprisal and, in
the latter, legitimate self-defense. 67 But all the other "sanctions," as
described by their proponents, have been taken not for compensation
or restoration of a subjective right but to punish for failure to fulfill an
"essential obligation" and to put an immediate stop to it.
When one examines the motives for these actions, as explained by
Heads of State or ministers in speeches or official statements, and
when, furthermore, the nature of the obligation concerned is examined, it is striking to observe that the object of the measures taken
by "objectively injured" States (as described above) was indeed to punish for infringement of intentional law and to reestablish the legality.
The legal obligations concerned in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iran, Poland or the Falklands are easy to identify; the principle of non-re66. See M. Mohr, supra note 51.
67. See supra note 64.
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course to force and the prohibition of aggression are directly
connected with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the Argentinean
behavior in the Falklands and Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of a foreign State is at issue in both the
Afghanistan case, and in Lebanon; respect of a peoples' right to selfdetermination and to govern themselves has also served as a basis for
accusations against the USSR in Afghanistan and in Poland, where,
unusually, the Polish government was itself concerned. Frequently associated with peoples' rights, the guarantee of fundamental liberties
has also served as a legal ground for sanctions in the Afghan, Polish
and Iranian cases. Finally, in the Iran case, everyone, including the
I.C.J., agreed that there had been a flagrant violation of diplomatic
and consular privileges and immunities on the part of the Islamic Republic. 68 This list should include the measures taken in the summer of
1985 and later in 1986, again by some Western countries, but more
particularly by France, against persistent apartheid practiced by the
government of South Africa.
Could this, then, be said to constitute a universal consecration of
an "actio popularis" in international law? 69 The evidence of discussions within the ILC has raised a number of questions concerning the
regime of responsibility for infringement of "community obligations."
While the right of states "objectively injured" to take measures against
states responsible for certain clearly illegal acts is no longer really
questioned, the nature and form of the responses required of these
states as defenders of the international legal order are still under
70
discussion.
Even so, the contemporary use of the umbrella term "countermeasures" seems to have encouraged an amalgamation of different
legal institutions, reprisals, retortion, institutional sanctions, and even
legitimate self-defense. 71 They are certainly all responses to a previous
68. For references concerning each of these cases see Dupuy, Observations sur laPratique,
supra note 10.
69. See Alland, supra note 51; Malanczuk, supra note 64; Dupuy, supra notes I & 10.
70. See references to discussions in the ILC and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly relating to the reports of Special Rapporteur Riphagen (1980-1984) by Spinedi in M. SPINEDI
& B. SIMMA, supra note 1, at 391-93.
71. For the use of the term "counter-measures" in the context of the United States-France
aviation dispute see Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration-or Both? The 1978 United StatesFrance Aviation Dispute, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 785 (1980). For general problems with countermeasures and, in particular, the risk of confusion between different notions, see Alland, supra
note 51; Dupuy, Observations sur la Pratique, supra note 10. Reprisals always come within a
bilateral framework. They are the answer to a persistent wrongful act. See Dominice, Observations sur les Droits de l'Etat Victime d'un Fait Internationalernent Illicite, 2 DROIT INT'L 17-31
(1982). Institutional sanctions, the model of which may be found in the measures that the U.N.
Security Council may take on the basis of art. 41 of the U.N. Charter are fundamentally different.
The states which apply them will not be acting because they have a common interest in reestab-
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violation of law, but there the likeness stops. Beyond that, the framework within which they occur and their consequences are completely
different. The clear danger here is that, starting with the diversification
of regimes of responsibility for different kinds of wrongful acts, a tendency may appear to confuse distinct legal institutions and give rise to
uncontrolled reactions or initiatives taken in the name of defense of
law and order but in reality aimed at satisfying very narrow national
interests.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In every system of law, responsibility as a legal institution plays a
leading part, because it both organizes and reveals the level of integration of this system, as well as the prevailing conceptions inside it regarding the nature of rights and of obligations, the consequences of
their infringement and, perhaps more deeply, the ethical and social
foundations of the whole. The establishment of a certain type of responsibility requires contemplation of the relationship it defines between the subjects of law, their acts and the community to which they
belong.
This explains why it is not surprising that presently we see a real
evolution of international responsibility (which does not necessarily
imply that the international legal system is in crisis, if one sees here a
pathological meaning). It explains also why the task of scholars cannot
be restricted to a purely empirical commentary on each one of the new
regimes of responsibility (or "liability") which are appearing, without
trying at the same time to perceive them in relation to their structural
significance. Thus, although the contemporary institutions and regimes of a strict international liability and of an international "criminal" responsibility appear distinct, they both proceed from a common
origin: the classical legal regime of international responsibility of
states as it was generally understood only a little more than two decades ago and as it still seems predominantly understood in the deci72
sions of the I.C.J. and arbitral tribunals.
Observing the general evolution of the law of state responsibility
since the beginning of this century, it is most striking to observe that it
has gone through different stages of objectivization, while the core elelishing international peace, and they will not take measures against the perpetrator of an illegal
act without consultation; instead they will apply a decision made by the collective security body,
which will be the only body qualified to initiate penalties. The end result is neither material
compensation for some injury nor the restoration of the law for itself, but the reestablishment of
a situation of peace. Indeed, it is often forgotten that the Security Council is neither prosecutor
nor judge, but the political body in charge of maintaining peace.
72. See supra notes 23 & 59.
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ments of the theory of international responsibility have remained the
same.
The first step was taken, as mentioned above, by eliminating all
reference to the subjective and psychological dimensions of "fault,"
and replacing it with the notion of wrongful act as the origin of responsibility. Then, as a second step, an attempt was made by some
authors, to objectivize completely the state's fact-creating responsibility, by eliminating, in relation to some sovereign activities, any necessity of proving the wrongful character of the act. Thus, responsibility
was reduced to a pure liability. A few years later, a third step was
taken, though in the opposite direction; namely, that of "overqualification" of the fact at the origin of responsibility, designated there as a
"crime" in view of the particular importance of the obligation thus
breached. In this new context, what is objectivized is no longer the
fact at the origin of a primary obligation to make reparations, but the
right or interest awarded to the states other than those individually
effected, to act in view of reestablishing legality.
Comparing these two contemporary and contradictory trends,
which, as such, do not seem to have definitively penetrated into the
sphere of positive international law, one should notice both their
profound differentiation as well as their common origin in the classical
law of international responsibility. One is entirely aimed at extending
the ordinary function of responsibility, i.e. reparation. In this respect,
material damage is for it of essential importance; it emphasizes the
obligation of the origin State of the harmful activity. The second, on
the contrary, has as its essential purpose the restoration of legality.
Material damage is superfluous; it focuses on the rights of the victim
States (both the subjectively and the objectively affected ones) much
more than on the duties of the responsible "criminal" State. Nevertheless, in both cases, the link with some of the characters of the common
matrix (namely the classical theory of state responsibility) is real if not
always self-evident.
International liability, then, must not be seen as a "liability for activities not prohibited by international law," since the lawfulness of an
activity depends very much on the way it is carried out and on the
increasing presence of obligations of due diligence which are established under the cover of a general obligation of cooperation, particularly in the field of hazardous activities and harmless use of territory.
The foundation or legal basis of this regime, then, at least in general
customary law, is the commitment of a wrongful act, the proof of
which may no longer be the burden of the victim state, in cases when
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presumptions of responsibility could be used, thanks to the existence
of sufficiently well-defined international standards.
As for the responsibility for international crimes, it proceeds from
the distinction which already exists in the law of state responsibility
between reparation of the material damage and restoration of the legality, by emphasizing the second, which could then be demanded by
every state since it concerns the respect of "community obligations"
("obligationes omnium et erga omnes").
Thus, in each case, it seems a little too early to proclaim the death
of the unity of international responsibility and its disintegration into
several distinct and fully autonomous regimes, even if, from some
point of view, such an evolution may appear desirable.

